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Risk-based sentencing regimes use an offender’s statistical likelihood
of returning to crime in the future to determine the amount of time he or she
spends in prison. Many criminal justice reformers see this as a fair and
efficient way to shrink the size of the incarcerated population, while
minimizing sacrifices to public safety. But risk-based sentencing is
indefensible even (and perhaps especially) by the lights of the theory that
supposedly justifies it. Instead of trying to cut time in prison for those who
are least likely to reoffend, officials should focus sentencing reform on the
least advantaged who tend to be the most likely to reoffend.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, prison populations in the United States began to
decline for the first time since the early 1970s.1 Fiscally conservative
policymakers and redemption-focused Evangelical advocacy groups joined
criminal justice reformers on the traditional liberal left in a growing
bipartisan movement to replace the “tough on crime” tactics of the previous
four decades with a new “smart on crime” approach.2
The key political challenge for this movement is to find ways to reduce
the number of people in American jails and prisons without jeopardizing
public safety. Elected officials contemplating various methods for reducing
prison populations must balance considerations of fairness and efficiency
with the kinds of populist appeals to punitive, racially charged, and alarmist
narratives about crime that can hurt them at the polls.3 Reformers, academics,
and policymakers have latched onto the idea of doing this by expanding the

1
Nazgol Ghandnoosh, U.S. Prison Population Trends: Massive Buildup and Modest
Decline, SENT’G PROJECT (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/u-s-prison-population-trends-massive-buildup-and-modest-decline/ [https:
//perma.cc/86EJ-3T8Y].
2
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN : THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION —AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 4 (2017). But see Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in
Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 260–73 (2018) (arguing that this consensus
is more limited than appearances suggest). The arguments I make below support Levin’s
thesis.
3
See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY , PUNISHING RACE : A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA
77–114 (2014).
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use of statistical risk assessment in policing,4 prosecution,5 pretrial
detention,6 and sentencing.7
Risk-based sentencing, in particular, has been central to recent law
reform efforts.8 Proponents see risk-based sentencing as an efficient way to
shrink the social and economic footprint of American criminal justice
systems while minimizing sacrifices to public safety.9 Many states already
have statutes that require sentencing officials to use risk-assessment tools,10
and those that do not are “seriously considering” adopting similar statutes.11

4
See, e.g., THOMAS ABT , BLEEDING OUT : THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF
URBAN VIOLENCE—AND A BOLD NEW PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE STREETS 115–33 (2019);
LESLIE W. KENNEDY , JOEL M. CAPLAN & ERIC L. PIZA , RISK -BASED POLICING : EVIDENCE BASED CRIME PREVENTION WITH BIG DATA AND SPATIAL ANALYTICS 71–100, 118–24
(2018).
5
Andrew Gutherie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV . 705,
716–27 (2016).
6
Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 507–18 (2018).
7
Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO . L.J. 57, 63 (2018); Cecilia Klingele, The
Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV ., 537, 539
(2015).
8
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 6B.09 (AM . L. INST ., Proposed Final
Draft 2017); 42 PA . CONS . STAT. § 2154.7 (2021); TENN . CODE ANN . § 41-1-412(b) (2021);
WASH . REV . CODE § 9.94A.500(1) (2021).
9
Christopher Slobogin, Limiting Retributivism and Individual Prevention, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE OF PUNISHMENT 49, 49–61 (Farah
Focquaert, Elizabeth Shaw & Bruce N. Waller eds., 2020) [hereinafter Slobogin, Limiting
Retributivism]; Christopher Slobogin, A Defence of Modern Risk-Based Sentencing, in
PREDICTIVE SENTENCING: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 107, 107–25 (Jan W. de
Keijser, Julian V Roberts & Jesper Ryberg eds., 2019) [hereinafter Slobogin, Modern RiskBased Sentencing]; Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and
Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 680 (2016);
RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM
63 (2013); Michael Marcus, MPC—The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk
Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751, 776 (2009); Douglas Husak, Why Legal Philosophers
(Including Retributivists) Should Be Less Resistant to Risk-Based Sentencing, in PREDICTIVE
SENTENCING: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 33, 33–55 (Jan W. de Keijser, Julian
V Roberts & Jesper Ryberg eds., 2019); John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment
in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCH. 489, 493–94 (2016).
10
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.010(2) (West 2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93615(a)(1)(B) (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1-412(b) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 204a(b)(1) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504-A:15(I) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.500(1) (2021); cf. ALA. CODE § 12-25-33(6) (2021); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2154.5(a)(6) (2009).
11
Douglas A. Berman, Are Costs a Unique (and Uniquely Problematic) Kind of
Sentencing Data?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 159, 160 (2012).
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The Supreme Court held in Jurek v. Texas that even death sentences
based on determinations of dangerousness pass constitutional muster,12
noting that “any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s
probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what
punishment to impose.”13
According to its to proponents, risk-based sentencing is justified by the
“limiting retributivist” theory developed by Norval Morris and adopted in the
Model Penal Code (MPC) sentencing provisions.14 The MPC states that “no
crime-reductive or other utilitarian purpose of sentencing may justify a
punishment outside the ‘range of severity’ proportionate to the gravity of the
offense, the harm to the crime victim, and the blameworthiness of the
offender.”15 Nonetheless, on this view it is morally permissible to use riskbased sentencing as an efficiency-maximizing allocation mechanism for
distributing punishment within the range of deserved sentencing severity.
Furthermore, according to risk-based sentencing proponents, that range can
be wide enough to permit large sentencing disparities between people
convicted of similar offenses.16
This article, however, shows that risk-based sentencing cannot be
vindicated even if one assumes the core theoretical premises that proponents
take to be sufficient for its justification. For the sake of argument, as such,
this article grants the following three premises:
1. Limiting retributivism is the best theoretical framework to
determine the moral permissibility of risk-based sentencing.
2. Current methods of risk assessment yield reliable information
about every offender’s individual risk of recidivism.

12

Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275–76 (1976).
Id. at 275.
14
MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM . L. INST ., Proposed Final
Draft 2017). The Model Penal Code eschews the “retributivist” label but nonetheless adopts
the substance of the limiting retributivist theory part and parcel. Norval Morris develops the
limiting retributivist theory in The Future of Imprisonment, though he does not take that
theory to provide strong justification for risk-based sentencing (or what in the 1980s was
called “selective incapacitation”) until almost a decade later. See Norval Morris & Marc
Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUST . 1, 36–37 (1985).
15
MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM . L. INST ., Proposed Final
Draft 2017).
16
See, e.g., Slobogin, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 9, at 49 (“[A] system of relatively
wide sentence ranges derived from retributive principles, in combination with short minimum
sentences that are enhanced under limited circumstances by statistically-driven risk
assessment and management, can alleviate many of the inherent tensions between desert and
prevention, between deontology and political reality, and between the desire for community
input and the allure of expertise.”).
13
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3. Risk-based sentencing will be used solely to allocate reductions
in sentencing severity from current levels, not to increase the
amount of time spent in prison for anyone.
This Article demonstrates why risk-based sentencing is unjust, and
potentially inefficient, even if one takes all three of these premises as given.
In Part I, this Article outlines the argument in favor of risk-based sentencing
under the Limiting Retributivist theory developed by Norval Morris and
adopted in the MPC’s new provisions on sentencing.
Part II examines the range of normative arguments against risk-based
sentencing in the existing literature and illustrates some of their logical and
empirical shortcomings. As it stands, recent criticisms cannot completely
undermine the prevailing rationale without further explication and extension.
Furthermore, Part II builds on the existing critical literature and shows that
risk-based sentencing is ultimately indefensible, even by its proponents’ own
standard of evaluation.
Part III dissects the idea that risk-based sentencing is an efficient way
to maximize the “incapacitation effects” of incarceration at the lowest
possible cost. Criminological measures of incapacitation effects fail to
account for replacement effects, crime inside of prisons and jails, and the
corrosive and sometimes counterproductive effects of concentrated
incarceration in disadvantaged neighborhoods. As such, policymakers do not
have a clear picture of the effects of risk-based sentencing on public safety
or aggregate social wellbeing more generally.
Part IV lays out this Article’s central normative argument against riskbased sentencing, starting from the same core premises and theoretical
framework that its proponents take to justify the practice. The argument
proceeds in the following five steps, with the key principles derived at each
step in bold font:
a. First, this Article shows that the Limiting Retributivist
framework that supposedly justifies risk-based sentencing is
motivated by Uncertainty about Desert: the premise that it is
impossible to know the precise level or severity of punishment
an offender deserves in any given case.
b. Second, this article shows that Uncertainty about Desert
entails Skepticism About Sentencing Guidelines: that
existing guidelines cannot ensure that sentencing severity falls
within the morally permissible or “not undeserved” range.
c. Third, this Article provides an independent defense of
Asymmetry: the idea that judges should strongly favor
punishing people less than they deserve over punishing them
more than they deserve.
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d. Fourth, this Article briefly defends Disadvantage as a
Mitigating Factor, according to which social and economic
disadvantage should mitigate one’s liability to legal punishment
for most crime.17
e. Finally, this Article shows that based on these four principles,
officials should focus sentence reductions on the least socially
and economically advantaged—who also tend to pose the
greatest risk of reoffending—rather than those who pose the
lowest risk.
There are five important caveats about the scope of this argument. First,
this Article argues against risk-based sentencing as a normative matter rather
than on constitutional or doctrinal grounds.18 Second, the argument against
risk-based sentencing does not apply specifically to “algorithmic” or
“statistical” risk-assessment methods. Instead, it applies whenever risk is
calculated with reference to proxies for socio-economic status regardless of
whether the calculation is done by a statistical instrument, clinical
psychologist or social worker, or sentencing judge. Third, this Article sets
aside questions about the morality and efficiency of using risk assessments
based on both gender and age at sentencing.19 Those questions are addressed

17

For a detailed defense of this premise, see generally Christopher Lewis, Inequality,
Incentives, Criminality, and Blame, 22 LEGAL THEORY 153 (2016).
18
For a critique of risk-based sentencing on constitutional grounds, see Sonja B. Starr,
Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN . L.
REV . 803, 821–42 (2014).
19
Men are much more likely to commit crime than women. See, e.g., Darrell
Steffensmeiser & Emilie Allan, Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered Theory of Female
Offending, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 459, 463 (1996); MEDA CHESNEY-LIND & LISA PASKO, THE
FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN AND CRIME 97–119 (2013); Karen Heimer & Stacy De
Coster, The Gendering of Violent Delinquency, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 277, 293–94 (1999). And
gender is often heavily weighted in risk-based sentencing and parole decisions. See Starr,
supra note 18, at 823 (“Many of the risk prediction instruments now used for sentencing and
parole decisions incorporate gender.”). Similarly, offenders tend to “age out” of crime. See,
e.g., Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 552, 581 (1983) (“Age is everywhere correlated with crime. Its effects on crime
do not depend on other demographic correlates of crime. Therefore it cannot be explained by
these correlates and can be explained without reference to them. Indeed, it must be explained
without reference to them.”); Elizabeth P. Shulman, Laurence D. Steinberg & Alex R. Piquero,
The Age-Crime Curve in Adolescence and Early Adulthood is Not Due to Age Differences in
Economic Status, 42 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 848, 848 (2013). Like gender, age is heavily
weighted in risk-based sentencing. See, e.g., Megan T. Stevenson & Christopher Slobogin,
Algorithmic Risk Assessments and the Double-Edged Sword of Youth, 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
681, 688–700 (2018) (showing that age explains over half of the variation in the individual
risk scores rendered by a number of risk-assessment instruments commonly used in criminal
sentencing, including the COMPAS Violent Recidivism Risk Score).
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elsewhere in the literature.20 Fourth, this Article avoids the broad spectrum
of normative questions one might have about the use of prior criminal
convictions in risk-based sentencing.21 Prior convictions are one of the
strongest predictors of future crime.22 Much of the analysis to come does, in
my view, applies to risk assessment based on prior criminal convictions.23
But showing that society should stop punishing people with prior convictions
more severely than first-time offenders, ceteris paribus, requires arguments
separate from the ones offered here.24 Fifth, and finally, there are reasons to
be skeptical of the idea that punishment can ever be “deserved,”25 but this
20

See, e.g., Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 19, at 682 (“[R]isk assessment algorithms
should be transparent about the factors that most influence the score. Only in that way can
courts and legislators engage in an explicit discussion about whether, and to what extent,
young age should be considered a mitigator or an aggravator in fashioning criminal
punishment.”); Gina Schouten, Are Unequal Incarceration Rates Unjust to Men?, 3 L. ETHICS
& PHIL. 136, 149 (2015) (defending the plausibility of the premise that “men are victims of
injustice because their genetic or social endowment makes them likelier to end up in prison.”).
21
I take on this task in Christopher Lewis, The Paradox of Recidivism, 70 EMORY L.J.
1209 (2021).
22
See, e.g., Paul Gendreau, Tracy Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the
Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575 (1996);
Shawn D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal
Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49
CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28 (2011) (“[Y]oung novice offenders are redeemed [(i.e., have a similar
probability of future offending as otherwise similar people with no prior convictions)] after
approximately 10 years of remaining crime free. For older offenders, the redemption period is
considerably shorter. Offenders with extensive criminal histories, however, either never
resemble their nonconvicted counterparts or only do so after a crime-free period of more than
20 years.”). Having a record of past convictions is also a proxy for low socio-economic status.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 17 (2013).
23
In The Paradox of Recidivism, supra note 21, at 1246–56, I argue that given how
severely the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction often narrow people’s life
prospects, those with prior convictions face stronger incentives to commit future crime than
people with no criminal record. If and when they re-offend, as such, their crimes manifest less
ill-will than an otherwise similar crime committed by a first-time offender would and are thus
less blameworthy. Given the many ways in which a mere arrest can similarly narrow one’s
life prospects, this analysis could be extended even further to risk assessment based on arrests
or other contact with the criminal justice system that does not always lead to a criminal
conviction. See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 826–44 (2015)
(documenting the negative consequences of having an arrest record for people’s immigration
status, eligibility for public housing, job stability, child custody, and educational
opportunities).
24
See Lewis, supra note 21, at 1215–40.
25
As Scanlon puts it, “a desert-based justification for treating a person in a certain
way . . . holds this treatment to be justified simply by what the person is like and what he or
she has done, independent of (1) the fact that treating the person in this way will have good
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article’s evaluation of risk-based sentencing does not depend on this
skepticism.
I. THE RATIONALE FOR RISK-BASED SENTENCING
From a pure consequentialist perspective—where punishment is
warranted if and only if the future benefits of any given sentencing decision
outweigh the costs—risk assessment should be given free reign.26 Under
some background circumstances, risk-based sentencing might be more
harmful than beneficial.27 But on such a view, there is no reason to be
skeptical of risk assessment in principle.
Alternatively, according to an orthodox retributive theory of
punishment (or at least a caricature of such a view), a sentencing decision is
justified if and only if it gives the offender what they deserve based on the
seriousness of the offense and how blameworthy the offender is for
committing it without regard to the future consequences that might flow from
that sentencing decision.28 Under this theory, risk assessment should play no
role in determining the length or severity of criminal sentences except,
insofar as the factors that make one more likely to also make one more
blameworthy.29
As such—especially if the options under consideration are limited to the
orthodox consequentialist and retributive theories that American law students
are introduced to in the first-year criminal law course—the moral
permissibility of risk-based sentencing may appear completely dependent
upon abstract questions about the justification of punishment.30 This is not
effects (or that treating people like him or her in this way will have such effects); (2) the fact
that this treatment is called for by some (justified) institution or practice; or (3) the fact that
the person could have avoided being subject to this treatment by choosing appropriately, and
therefore cannot complain of it.” Thomas M. Scanlon, Giving Desert Its Due, 16 PHIL.
EXPLORATIONS 101, 101 (2013). I am doubtful that state punishment under the criminal law
can ever be justified in this way. See also id. at 103–05; cf. VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF
HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 60–87 (2011).
26
See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 133–50 (1975).
27
See infra Part III.
28
For perhaps the most uncompromising version of this view, see MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 104–52 (1997).
29
See infra Part II.A; cf. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 428 (2006) (arguing
that prior convictions ought to play a role at sentencing since they are relevant to both the
offender’s risk of future recidivism as well as his or her present blameworthiness).
30
See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 29–71 (6th ed. 2008); SANFORD KADISH, STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, CAROL
STEIKER & RACHEL BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 89–
106 (9th ed. 2012).
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the theoretical landscape upon which risk-based sentencing debates take
place, however.
A. MORAL PERMISSIBILITY AND LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM

By and large, risk-based sentencing proponents are not pure
consequentialists, and critics are not orthodox retributivists. Rather,
proponents argue that risk-based sentencing is justified under the “limiting
retributivist” theory which is, as Richard Frase calls it, “the de facto
consensus theoretical model of criminal punishment” in the United States31
Critics, on the other hand, do not (for the most part) explicitly adhere to any
theoretical framework, and the underlying normative basis for their criticism
is often inchoate, as this article will demonstrate in Part II.
According to the limiting retributivist view set out in the MPC, crime
control should be the guiding aim of punishment.32 But the maximum (and
sometimes minimum) severity of punishment that is permissible in any
individual case is limited by the offender’s moral desert, hence the “limiting”
label.33 As the MPC notes, sentencing officials should “render decisions in
all cases within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses,
the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders.”34
Orthodox consequentialist and retributive sentencing theories both face
a number of seemingly intractable and well-worn objections. For example, a
sentencing regime guided solely by consequentialist considerations could in
principle condone the punishment of innocent people, the extremely harsh
punishment of people convicted of minor offenses, or total leniency toward
offenders convicted of extremely heinous acts, if doing so could promote
social welfare or aggregate utility.35 This strikes some as an intolerable
theoretical result.36 Similarly, a pure retributive sentencing theory would
seemingly mandate punishing a “deserving” or blameworthy offender even

31

FRASE, supra note 9, at 4; MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM . L.
INST ., Proposed Final Draft 2017).
32
MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM . L. INST ., Proposed Final
Draft 2017).
33
Id.; NORVAL MORRIS , THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73–77 (1974).
34
MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM . L. INST ., Proposed Final
Draft 2017).
35
See, e.g., Saul Smilansky, Utilitarianism and the ‘Punishment’ of the Innocent: The
General Problem, 50 ANALYSIS 256, 257 (1990) (“[I]n the creation and daily application of
the criminal law we are constantly facing a general situation in which utilitarians would be
obliged to promote the ‘punishment’ of the innocent.”).
36
Id.
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if it were certain that no good consequences would follow from doing so.37 It
is difficult to explain how making an offender suffer could be intrinsically,
rather than merely instrumentally, valuable.38 And even if it were
intrinsically valuable to punish people who deserve it, it may not follow that
the state is morally required (or even permitted) to spend public resources on
that objective.39
These problems led a number of theorists before Morris—most notably
John Rawls and H.L.A. Hart—to advance various forms of “hybrid” or
“mixed” theories of punishment.40 In Rawls’ view, institutions and systems
of punishment should be evaluated according to consequentialist
considerations;, while the individual conviction and sentencing decisions
rendered by juries and judges should be justified and evaluated in light of
retributive, or non-consequentialist, considerations.41 In Rawls’ words, ,
punishment should be given “only to an offender for an offense.”42 Hart
argued, similarly, that crime control should be the “general justifying aim”
of penal institutions but that the “distribution” of punishment should be
governed by retributive principles, prohibiting the punishment of the
innocent.43
Norval Morris was animated by similar concerns to those that underlie
Rawls’ and Hart’s “hybrid” theories.44 But Morris was more concerned than
Rawls and Hart were with the principles that should govern sentencing
decisions; and Morris saw a criminal trial’s sentencing phase more distinctly
from the conviction phase than Rawls and Hart did. Whereas Rawls and Hart
posited that retributive principles could determine decision-making at both
the sentencing and conviction phases of the trial, Morris was skeptical.
Morris was concerned about another problem of retributivism that Rawls and
Hart paid less attention to: the difficulty of measuring how much punishment

37
As Kant famously put it, “Even if a civil society were to be dissolved . . . the last
murderer remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so that each has done to him
what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted
upon this punishment.” IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary Gregor
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
38
TADROS, supra note 25, at 60–87.
39
See, e.g., id. at 78–83; David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1623, 1627–30 (1992).
40
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–7 (1955); H. L. A. HART ,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1–28 (1968).
41
Rawls, supra note 40, at 4–7.
42
HART, supra note 40, at 9.
43
Id. at 1–28.
44
MORRIS , supra note 33, at 58–85.
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any given offender “deserves.” This difficulty is especially acute at
sentencing, though not at the conviction phase.
Criminal law theorists often call this the “anchoring problem” for
retributive sentencing theory.45 “Cardinal proportionality”—requires
sentences to be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the extent
to which the offender is blameworthy for it, without reference to how others
might be sentenced for similar offenses. This demands a kind of moral
currency-exchange: time in prison must be weighed against the nature of the
crime and the extent to which the offender is blameworthy for committing it.
But there is no consensus on what the appropriate “exchange rate” ought to
be.46 For example, should someone convicted of assault and battery with no
apparent justification or excuse get five weeks, five months, or five years in
prison? Opinions vary widely on such questions and limiting retributivism
does not provide criteria to resolve them.
According to Morris, it is impossible to know exactly how severely any
given offender deserves to be punished, because judgements about desert are
inherently imprecise. But, Morris argued, there are certain broad parameters
outside of which punishment would seem patently unjust to almost anyone.47
These parameters, in Morris’ view, are “overlapping and quite broad.”48
This view underlies the way that proponents think about the justification
of risk-based sentencing. As Skeem and Lowencamp put it, an offender’s
future risk of reoffending “is considered—and in our view should be
considered—within bounds set by moral concerns about culpability.”49
Specially, “retributive concerns set a permissible range for the sentence (e.g.,
five to nine years), and risk assessment is used to select a particular sentence
from within that range (e.g., eight years for high risk).”50 Crucially, Skeem
and Lowencamp state, “Risk assessment should never be used to sentence
offenders to more time than they morally deserve.”51 Limiting retributivism
thus supplies the moral principles under which proponents think that risk45

See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16
CRIME & JUST. 55, 83 (1992).
46

Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its
Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 94–96 (2013); cf. William Samuel & Elizabeth Moulds,
The Effect of Crime Severity on Perceptions of Fair Punishment: A California Case
Study, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 931, 945 (1986) (arguing that “there is
widespread agreement among various demographic and political groupings in the
general population concerning what constitutes fair punishment for crimes.”).
47
48
49
50
51

MORRIS , supra note 33, at 59.
NORVAL MORRIS , MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 151 (1982).
Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 9, at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id.
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based sentencing is rendered permissible. But proponents think that riskbased sentencing is desirable, or economically efficient, not merely
permissible.
B. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND INCAPACITATION EFFECTS

Within the broad limits set by inevitably imprecise judgments of what
people deserve, Morris thought sentencing decisions should efficiently
promote crime control. The “parsimony principle,” as Morris calls it, is the
idea that at sentencing, the “least restrictive (punitive) sanction necessary to
achieve defined social purposes should be imposed.”52
The “parsimony principle” is central to contemporary defenses of riskbased sentencing under the limiting retributivist outlook. The newly revised
MPC provisions on sentencing make this argument explicitly:
If used as a tool to encourage sentencing judges to divert low-risk offenders from
prisons to community sanctions, risk assessments conserve scarce prison resources for
the most dangerous offenders, reduce the overall costs of the corrections system, and
avoid the human costs of unneeded confinement to offenders, offenders’ families, and
communities.53

In other words, risk-based sentencing seems like an efficient allocation
mechanism for scarce prison resources. The fact that one inmate is more
likely to reoffend than another is unlikely to have much effect on how much
it costs to feed or house the prisoner, for example. But the benefits of
incarcerating any given offender would seem to vary enormously depending
on how likely he or she is to commit future crime. This is primarily due to
“incapacitation effects.”54 The more likely one is to commit crime, the
thought goes, the greater threat one poses to public safety outside of prison.
Incarceration shields the public from those in prison;; so there is much less

52

MORRIS , supra note 33 at 60–62.
MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. d (AM . L. INST ., Proposed Final
Draft 2017).
54
See, e.g., Alex Piquero & Alfred Blumstein, Does Incapacitation Reduce Crime, 23 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 267, 267–68 (2007). Deterrence (either “specific” or “general”)
could potentially be thought of as a secondary avenue through which risk assessment might
contribute to crime control. If ‘riskier’ offenders are given harsher sentences, they may be
more strongly deterred from reoffending. But these effects are likely to be much weaker than
any incapacitation-related effects since the severity of a potential punishment is much less
powerful as a deterrent than the likelihood of being caught, which sentencing and corrections
officials cannot control. See, e.g., Daniel Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a
Criminologist for Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 83, 85 (2013).
53
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benefit associated with incarcerating someone who is unlikely to reoffend
than there is with locking up someone who is at a high risk of recidivism.55
As such, cutting prison sentences for lower-risk offenders appears to be
both morally permissible and economically efficient. On its face, risk-based
sentencing seems like the most efficient way to reduce the fiscal burden of
prison systems with the lowest possible cost to public safety.
II. INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST RISK-BASED SENTENCING
Risk-based sentencing has, however, come under intense criticism in
both the popular media and the scholarly literature.56 This criticism largely
focuses on various forms of racial disparity that risk-based sentencing might
engender or exacerbate.57
Risk-assessment instruments rely on demographic information that is
constitutive of or correlated with socio-economic status—and thus, with
race—to predict how likely any given offender is to return to crime when
they re-enter the public.58 The factors that drive these predictions include
55
See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON , THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145–61 (1975); PETER W.
GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION x–xii (1982).
56
See generally Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine
Bias, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/838D-Q6C8] (arguing that risk-based
sentencing is biased against Black defendants); Starr, supra note 18 (arguing that risk-based
sentencing violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment); BERNARD E.
HARCOURT , AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING , AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (arguing that “actuarial methods” in the administration and
enforcement of criminal law may be counterproductive to crime control aims, aggravate the
social costs of punishment, and distort conceptions of “just punishment”); Michael Tonry,
Predictions of Dangerousness in Sentencing: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 48 CRIME & JUST. 439
(2019) (arguing that risk-based sentencing unfairly penalizes defendants for personal
characteristics they have no control over).
57
The literature has focused mostly on disparities between Black people and White
people. But see Melissa Hamilton, The Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Disparate Impact on
Hispanics, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1553, 1563–77 (2019) (“[R]eporting on an empirical study
about risk assessment with Hispanics at the center.”) The literature has virtually ignored classbased inequality, except insofar as class is a proxy for race. This is understandable in the
constitutional evaluation of risk-based sentencing, given that race is a protected category under
the 14th Amendment, while class is not; but the lack of attention to class is less justifiable in
the broader normative policy analysis of risk-based sentencing.
58
Seena Fazel, Zheng Chang, Thomas Fanshawe, Niklas Langstrom, Paul Lichtenstein,
Henrik Larsson & Susan Mallett, Prediction of Violent Reoffending on Release from Prison:
Derivation and External Validation of a Scalable Tool, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 535, 540
(2016); Grant Harris, Marnie Rice & Catherine Cormier, Prospective Replication of the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide in Predicting Violent Recidivism Among Forensic Patients, 26
LAW & HUM . BEHAV . 377, 378 (2002); Martin Grann, Henrik Belfrage & Anders Tengstrom,
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education level, employment history, “high neighborhood deprivation”
(which is measured according to per capita educational attainment), welfare
recipiency, immigration status, marital history, residential stability,
neighborhood crime rates, social isolation, home ownership, whether one
lived with their biological parents until age sixteen, and whether one has been
a victim of crime themselves.59 Offenders who are well-off on these
measures—who are more likely to be White—will present a lower risk of
recidivism than those who are comparatively disadvantaged—who are more
likely to be Black.60 As a result, many White offenders will get lighter
sentences than Black people convicted of the same sorts of crime.
Critics claim that, insofar as risk-based sentencing tends to exacerbate
racial disparity, it is unjust and potentially inefficient.61 Part II canvases the
range of existing normative arguments given for this position and illustrates
some of their shortcomings.
A. ALGORITHMIC FAIRNESS
Policy analysts and data scientists offer technical critiques of risk-based
sentencing due to concerns about the predictive power of our current
statistical instruments. The most highly publicized critique was a 2016
exposé written by investigative journalists and researchers at the nonprofit
organization ProPublica.62 The report declares stridently that “[t]here’s
software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s biased
against [B]lacks.”63
But the ProPublica report is remarkably congenial toward the idea that
risk-based sentencing could be justified in principle.64 Indeed, the authors
accept similar normative principles to those that animate proponents of riskbased sentencing.65 As the ProPublica report puts it, “If computers could
accurately predict which defendants were likely to commit new crimes, the
criminal justice system could be fairer and more selective about who is
incarcerated and for how long.”66
Actuarial Assessment of Risk for Violence: Predictive Validity of the VRAG and the Historical
Part of the HCR-20, 27 CRIM . JUST . & BEHAV . 97, 98 (2000).
59
See sources cited supra note 58.
60
See, e.g., Bernard Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment,
27 FED . SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015).
61
See sources cited supra note 56.
62
Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, supra note 56.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
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Implicit in the ProPublica authors’ stance is the idea that if our
algorithmic risk instruments were able to predict future crime in an
“unbiased” way, then it would be fair and efficient to base our sentencing
decisions on the forecasts those instruments deliver. “The trick, of course, is
to make sure the computer gets it right”67 “If it’s wrong in one direction, a
dangerous criminal could go free. If it’s wrong in another direction, it could
result in someone unfairly receiving a harsher sentence or waiting longer for
parole than is appropriate.”68 But the report argues that these instruments—
in particular, the COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling
for Alternative Sanctions) tool, which is used in several state sentencing
systems—deliver unfair predictions because they produce racially disparate
error rates.69
Specifically, COMPAS was significantly more likely to classify Black
defendants as “high risk” even if they would not subsequently be rearrested
than White defendants who also avoided future arrests.70 COMPAS was also
much more likely to classify defendants as “low risk” who did subsequently
get rearrested if they were White than if they were Black.71 Thus, COMPAS
produced a higher percentage of “false positives” for Black defendants and a
higher percentage of “false negatives” for White defendants.
Northpointe (now Equivant), the company that developed COMPAS,
published a response to the ProPublica report which argued that COMPAS is
completely unbiased because rates of rearrest for those it classified as “high
risk” were equal for Black and White defendants, thus satisfying the principle
of “predictive parity.”72
Computer scientists and legal scholars continue to debate what
measures of “fairness” or “equality” risk-assessment instruments and other
algorithmic decision-making tools should incorporate and prioritize.73 It is
impossible for these technologies to achieve “predictive parity,”
Northpointe’s preferred measure of algorithmic fairness, while
simultaneously equalizing error rates (producing the same percentage of false

67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, supra note 56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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positives or false negatives) between constitutionally protected groups.74
Thus, sentencing officials must choose which standard to prioritize.
This technical literature by and large takes for granted the premise that
if risk-assessment instruments satisfied the appropriate standard of
“algorithmic fairness,” it would be fair and efficient for sentencing officials
to base their decisions on the predictions they produce.75 This premise
logically motivates inquiries about algorithmic fairness in the first place.
After all, if risk-based decision-making in sentencing were inescapably
unfair or inefficient, then there would be no point in fine-tuning the
algorithms in order to meet some internal standard of algorithmic fairness.
The very idea of algorithmic fairness would be absurd.
Thus, the technical literature on algorithmic fairness largely bypasses
the fundamental normative questions one must answer in order to know
whether officials should base sentencing decisions on assessments of an
offender’s future risk of recidivism and what constraints (if any) should limit
decisions made on such a basis. This Article seeks to shed light on these more
fundamental questions.
B. ORDINAL PROPORTIONALITY

The principle that crimes of equal moral severity should be punished
alike and that a crime of greater severity should be punished more harshly
than one that is relatively less severe—the principle of Ordinal
Proportionality76—seems clearly inconsistent with risk-based sentencing.
Andreas von Hirsch provides the most in-depth defense of ordinal
proportionality.77 In von Hirsch’s view, the principle of ordinal
proportionality can be derived from the conceptual nature of punishment
itself.78 Punishment, according to the prevailing view, necessarily conveys
censure, disapprobation, or blame (he uses these three terms
synonymously).79 As von Hirsch finds, “punishing consists of doing
74
Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns & Aaron Roth, Fairness
in Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, 50 SOCIO. METHODS & RSCH. 3, 23
(2018).
75
Id.
76
See ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, DESERVED CRIMINAL SENTENCES: AN OVERVIEW 55–62
(2017).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 17–22.
79
As Joel Feinberg famously put it, “Punishment is a conventional device for the
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’
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something unpleasant to someone, because he has committed a wrong, under
circumstances and in a manner that conveys disapprobation of the person for
his wrongdoing.”80
This expressive function is a necessary feature of punishment in any
context rather than a contingent feature of criminal punishment in
contemporary Anglo-American legal systems, on the standard view.81 For
example, punitive incarceration is supposedly distinguished from
involuntary civil commitment to a psychiatric hospital because the former
conveys censure while the latter does not—even if the physical conditions of
life in an asylum are otherwise more or less the same as life in prison. This
expressive function is salutary, according to von Hirsch.82 It gives victims an
acknowledgement that they were wronged, and it gives offenders an
opportunity to recognize the wrongfulness of their crimes, make efforts not
to reoffend, or to provide a justification for what they have done—which
acknowledges their status as a moral agent.83
the punishment is inflicted.” Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49
MONIST 397, 400 (1965). Feinberg does not use the word “blame” here, but the now-standard
view in moral philosophy about the psychological nature of blame is that it is constituted by
the same “attitudes of resentment and indignation” and “judgments of disapproval and
reprobation” he says that punishment expresses. See, e.g., R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 51–84 (1994); Susan Wolf, Blame, Italian Style, in REASONS
AND RECOGNITION: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.M. SCALON 332–47 (R. Jay Wallace,
Rahul Kumar & Samuel Freeman eds., 2011); Leonhard Menges, The Emotion Account of
Blame, 174 Phil. Stud. 257, 257 (2017). These authors generally take themselves to be
following P.F. Strawson’s famous essay Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1
(1962). But c.f. T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, AND BLAME
122–23 (2008) (defending a “relational” conception of blame according to which “[t]o blame
a person for an action . . . is to take that action to indicate something about the person that
impairs one’s relationship with him or her, and to understand that relationship in a way the
reflects this impairment.”) In other work, I defend an argument for the principle of ordinal
proportionality that does not depend on the “mereological” premise about the conceptual
nature of punishment that von Hirsch rests on, and instead grounds that principle on a political
norm of equal regard. The grounding of the principle of ordinal proportionality is not of central
importance here, so I do not explicate those arguments here.
80
VON HIRSCH, supra note 76, at 17.
81
This view is shared by a number of prominent criminal law theorists. See, e.g., Carol S.
Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L. J. 775, 800–06 (1997); Feinberg, supra note 79, at 400; VON
HIRSCH, supra note 76, at 17–22. But see Ambrose Y. K. Lee, Arguing Against the Expressive
Function of Punishment: Is The Standard Account That Insufficient?, 38 LAW & PHIL. 359,
359 (2019) (“[T]he standard account of punishment, according to which punishment is a kind
of hard treatment that is imposed on an alleged offender in response to her alleged wrongdoing,
can already properly account for punishment and distinguish it from other kinds of hard
treatment when it is properly clarified and understood.”).
82
VON HIRSCH, supra note 76, at 18.
83
Id.
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von Hirsch infers that “since punishment does and should convey
blame, its amount should reflect the degree of blameworthiness for the
criminal conduct.”84 von Hirsch tells us, “[b]y penalizing one kind of conduct
more severely than another, the punishing authority conveys the message that
the conduct is worse—which is appropriate only if the conduct is indeed
worse,” and goes on to say “[i]f penalties were ordered in severity
inconsistently with the comparative seriousness of crime, the less
reprehensible conduct would, undeservedly, receive the greater
reprobation.”85
The problem with risk-based sentencing, then, is that it does precisely
what the principle of ordinal proportionality forbids: it conveys different
degrees of blame or censure to people who committed equally reprehensible
crimes.86 As Michael Tonry puts it, “No one should be punished more
severely than [they] would otherwise be because [they are] rich or poor, well
or inadequately educated, married or single, working or unemployed.”87 But
these are exactly the factors that risk-assessment instruments use to predict
recidivism.
Proponents, however, argue that risk-based sentencing should and does
operate within the “‘range of severity’ proportionate to the gravity of
offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of
offenders” which is also the MPC’s criteria for permissible punishment.88 It
does not matter, under this limiting retributivist view, whether “high risk”
offenders are more or less blameworthy or culpable than “low risk” offenders
convicted of similar offenses.89 As long as officials render sentencing
decisions within the permissible range of severity, then the relative severity
with which one person is punished compared to one another is irrelevant.90
Cardinal Proportionality—ensuring that the severity of any given offender’s
sentence is appropriate in absolute terms, without reference to how severely
anyone else is punished—trumps Ordinal Proportionality, according to this
line of thought.91
The following hypothetical illustrates this reasoning:

84

Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 51.
86
Tonry, supra note 56, at 459.
87
Id.
88
MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM . L. INST ., Proposed Final
Draft 2017).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
85
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Petty Thieves: Mundungus and Peeves are petty thieves. Each of them
breaks into empty homes and steals some personal items worth $500. They
are caught, and eventually convicted of burglary. Mundungus is from a poor
family and was homeless and unable to find legitimate work at the time of
the offense. Peeves is well-off and from a wealthy background, but simply
enjoys the thrill of breaking into other peoples’ homes and stealing things on
the weekends. We can safely stipulate that Peeves is the more blameworthy
of the two, as such.
Now consider three potential sentencing options for the pair of burglars:
Option 1: Peeves gets probation on the grounds that, statistically, he
poses less of a future risk of reoffending given his wealthy background.
Mundungus gets a year in prison given his higher risk of recidivism.
Option 2: Mundungus gets ten years in prison, and Peeves gets a life
sentence without the possibility of parole on the grounds that he is much more
blameworthy for the offense than Mundungus.
Option 3: Mundungus gets one year in prison and Peeves gets two.
For all but the most extremely punitive readers, Option 1 is likely to
seem less unfair than Option 2—despite the fact that it is safe to assume
Mundungus is less blameworthy for the burglary than Peeves. Option 1
certainly seems unfair in that the less blameworthy person gets the harsher
sentence. But while Option 2 may preserve Ordinal Proportionality, it does
so at a cost to Cardinal Proportionality. And in both scenarios, neither of the
two burglars receives a proportional punishment in an absolute sense.
Option 3 preserves Ordinal Proportionality, but less clearly (or at least
less enormously) exceeds the bounds of Cardinal Proportionality. It may be
unclear to some readers whether Option 3 is preferable to Option 1. But
proponents of risk-based sentencing will argue that choosing Option 3 over
Option 1 amounts to demanding harsher punishment for the well-off with no
apparent benefit for the badly-off who are the supposed objects of critics’
concern.92 After all, Mundungus gets the same sentence in both scenarios.
Critics thus face a form of the “levelling down objection.”93 “Positive”
retributivists could respond that the relatively well-off offenders, who would
stand to benefit most from risk-based sentencing reform (like Peeves),

92

See sources cited supra note 9.
See, e.g., LARRY TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 247–48 (1993); G.A. Cohen, How to do Political
Philosophy, in ON THE CURRENCY OF EGALITARIAN JUSTICE, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 228–29 (Michael Otsuka ed., 2011).
93
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deserve to be punished more harshly than such reforms would allow.94 But
liberal and progressive critics of risk-based sentencing do not, for the most
part, endorse retributivism (at least not explicitly).95 Many on the progressive
and liberal left consider retributivism overly punitive,96 vulnerable to racially
biased application,97 and even outright barbaric.98 And even those who are
sympathetic to the view may not think that giving people the punishment they
deserve outweighs the potential drawbacks of punishment, such as the fiscal
burden it imposes on the citizenry.99
Thus, it is not clear how Ordinal Proportionality should be weighed
against other potentially competing values in assessing the case for and
against risk-based sentencing. The fact that risk-based sentencing seems
inconsistent with Ordinal Proportionality does not alone provide a
compelling reason to reject the former.100

94

The underlying basis of such a response could be either (1) a concern with the absolute,
or “cardinal” degree of severity with which we punish the well-off, or (2) a concern with the
relative, or “ordinal” degree of severity with which we punish them compared to the badlyoff. See, e.g., ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, DESERVED CRIMINAL SENTENCES § 5 (2017).
95
See supra Parts II.A, II.C–E.
96
See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Beyond Blame, BOSTON REV. (June 28, 2013),
https://bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibilityphilosophy-law/ [https://perma.cc/P6R5-XG3Z] (arguing that, despite scientific research on
the determinants of human behavior, which casts doubt on the idea of free will, recent decades
have been “boom years for blame,” and that “[r]etributive penal policy, which has produced
incarceration rates of unprecedented proportions in the United States, has been at the forefront
of the boom.”); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85,
94–95 (2003) (“It is not entirely an accident that retributivism has come to the fore during the
period of our crackdown.”); Robert Weisberg, Barrock Lecture: Reality-Challenged
Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1204, 1221 n.92 (2012) (asserting that
retributivism is “the very rationale for punishment most associated with the specific legal
changes of recent decades that are the most obvious causes of the great increase in
incarceration,” but noting separately that “much of the new sentencing legislation is probably
better explained by an angry devotion to incapacitation, especially in terms of ‘three strikes’
and other habitual offender laws.”).
97
See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1293 (2006) (arguing that judgments about desert are “opaque: they
appear to be influenced in some cases by racial bias or other extralegal considerations, but
such bias is cloaked by the moral authority of desert claims.”).
98
VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 73–
78 (2011).
99
See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, 26 NOÛS 447, 450–52 (1992).
100
Part III of this article will demonstrate that the comparative blameworthiness of lowand high-risk offenders undermines the prevailing rationale. But this argument requires more
than simply showing that risk-based sentencing is inconsistent with Ordinal Proportionality.

2022]

PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT

233

C. DISPARITY AND COMMUNITY

Perhaps the most powerful objection to risk-based sentencing is that it
is likely to increase race and class-based disparity in prison populations, and
that it will thus have harmful effects on poor, predominantly Black
communities where incarceration is already concentrated.101 As Starr puts it,
“[T]he mass incarceration problem in the United States is drastically
disparate in its distribution. This unequal distribution is a core driver of its
adverse social consequences, because it leaves certain neighborhoods and
subpopulations decimated.”102
There is a large literature documenting the harmful effects of
concentrated incarceration in poor, predominantly Black communities.103 But
the fact that risk-based sentencing leads to increased race- and class-based
disparity does not entail that it will necessarily increase the concentrated
incarceration of poor, Black people. After all, proponents cast risk-based
sentencing as a way to sensibly reduce prison populations, not as a way to
increase sentencing severity for Black people or the poor.104 So, if risk-based
sentencing were used solely as a mechanism for allocating reductions in
sentencing severity from the status quo, this objection would hold little
weight.
Critics are skeptical that risk-based sentencing could ever be used solely
to reduce imprisonment, however. As Starr says, “Although we do not know
whether [risk-based sentencing] will reduce incarceration on balance, the
most intuitive expectation is that it will increase incarceration for some
people (those deemed high risk) and reduce it for others (those deemed low
risk). If so, it will further demographically concentrate mass incarceration’s
impact.”105
More recent empirical research supports Starr’s and other critics’
skepticism: judges who are given algorithmic predictions of an offender’s
likelihood of future recidivism are more likely to impose longer sentences on
high-risk offenders than they would in the absence of such predictions.106
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Starr, supra note 18, at 836–39; HARCOURT , supra note 56, at 160–68.
Starr, supra note 18, at 837.
103
See infra Part III.A.
104
See, e.g., Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 9.
105
Starr, supra note 18, at 837. Erin Collins also argues that risk-based sentencing in fact
is not (and will not be) used solely to reduce prison populations. Erin Collins, Punishing Risk,
107 GEO. L. J. 57, 91–108 (2018).
106
Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of
Humans, 17–19 (Dec. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/215249
[https://perma.cc/6689VHX].
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But what if sentencing officials were constrained so that risk-based
sentencing could only be used to reduce sentence length? If the problem with
risk-based sentencing is that it exacerbates the concentrated incarceration of
the Black urban poor, then critics would be left without a reason to reject it,
assuming an effective set of constraints.107
Starr, however, identifies some obstacles to implementing such
constraints.108 For example, she argues that it would be difficult to enforce
the unidirectional use of risk assessments for mitigation or diversion from
incarceration.109 Judges and prosecutors are likely to push for longer
sentences for defendants perceived as high-risk, even if they are not given
risk-assessment data until a preliminary sentence is chosen.110 Such a practice
would simply substitute a lay assessment of risk for an algorithmic one. But
if bipartisan enthusiasm for criminal justice reform and reducing reliance on
incarceration continues to grow, these obstacles might be easier to overcome
than Starr suggests.
However, the objection outlined here could retain some force even if
risk-based sentencing were used solely as a mechanism for allocating
reductions in sentencing severity. The benefits of risk-based sentencing are
disproportionately realized by the low risk (and better-off) among the
population of convicted offenders.111 Those better-off offenders may thus
gain an advantage in subsequent competitions for “positional goods,” gaining
access to future jobs and other opportunities for advancement of which there
is a limited supply.112 As a result, higher risk offenders are objectively worse
off than they otherwise would be.113
But risk-based sentencing’s effects on competitions for positional goods
is likely to be small. Low-risk offenders are already better-off than high-risk
offenders along many metrics including education, employment history, and
neighborhood and family of origin, and thus may not be in competition for
107

See, e.g., Starr, supra note 18, at 816, 840, 870; Collins, supra note 105, at 91–108.
Starr, supra note 18, at 840.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 58.
112
See, e.g., FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 27–56 (1976); Harry Brighouse &
Adam Swift, Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods, 116 ETHICS 471, 472 (2006) (defining
positional goods as “goods with the property that one’s relative place in the distribution of the
good affects one’s absolute position with respect to its value. The very fact that one is worse
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the same positional goods upon re-entering the community, regardless of
how they are sentenced.114 Insofar as low- and high-risk offenders come from
different walks of life to begin with, risk-based sentencing does little to
change their relative positions.
As such, the case for risk-based sentencing hinges on whether it can be
used primarily or solely to reduce our overall reliance on incarceration. If
risk-based sentencing ends up simply redistributing the burdens of current
levels of imprisonment so that they fall even more heavily on the backs of
the disadvantaged—harming poor, predominantly Black communities—then
it becomes very difficult and perhaps impossible to justify.115 For the purpose
of argument, this article will assume that it is possible to constrain sentencing
officials to only use risk-assessment tools for the former. But, as shown in
Part IV, concerns about concentrated incarceration’s negative effects weigh
against risk-based sentencing even given that assumption.
D. CRIME BACKLASH

Some critics—most notably Sonja Starr and Bernard Harcourt—argue
that risk-based sentencing could potentially increase overall crime rates
despite the incapacitation-related benefits that proponents cite.116 There are
three arguments for this objection.
1. Undermining Perceived Legitimacy
First, as Starr argues, risk-based sentencing could undermine the
perceived legitimacy of criminal justice systems.117 This would in turn cause
more crime because when people perceive the law or law enforcement as
illegitimate they are less likely to obey.118 Risk-based sentencing, as Starr
puts it, “involves the state explicitly telling judges that poor people should
get longer sentences because they are poor—and, conversely, that
socioeconomic privilege should translate into leniency.”119 She argues that
Dressing up that generalization in scientific language may have succeeded in
forestalling public criticism, but mostly because few Americans understand these [risk
assessment] instruments or are even aware of them. If the instruments were better
understood (and as [risk-based sentencing] expands, perhaps they will be), they would
send a clear message to disadvantaged groups: the system really is rigged. Further, if
114
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that message undermines the criminal justice system’s legitimacy in disadvantaged
120
communities, it could undermine [risk-based sentencing’s] crime prevention aims.

It is unlikely that those who are teetering on the brink of committing
serious crimes would be swayed much in either direction by their perceptions
of the legitimacy of the instruments used in risk-based sentencing, however,
as most people are unaware of changes in the criminal law and sentencing
policy in general.121 Instead, people tend to use their own moral intuitions to
guess at what the legal rules in question might be.122 One survey found that
35% of offenders “didn’t think about” what the likely punishment would be
for the crime they committed, while 18% responded “I had no idea, or
thought I knew but was wrong.”123
Furthermore, even if prospective offenders knew of the increased use of
risk assessment at sentencing, that would not necessarily undermine their
perception of the system’s legitimacy. After all, people will only perceive a
risk-based sentencing system as illegitimate if they think there is something
wrong with risk-based sentencing. Perhaps there is not, as proponents argue
and some prospective offenders may agree.
2. Deterrence and Relative Elasticity
According to the rational choice theory that underlies economic models
of crime and punishment, people are more likely to be deterred from crime
by harsher prospective penalties and less likely to be deterred by more lenient
sentencing regimes.124 Harcourt argues that overall crime rates that result
from any given allocation of penal severity—holding the overall rate of
incarceration constant—depends in part on the “relative elasticity” of
different groups of offenders to punishment.125 In Harcourt’s view, if people
who are more likely to commit crime have lower elasticity to punishment
120
Id. (citing William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1825–
30 (1998)).
121
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 954 (2003).
122
Id.; John M. Darley, Catherine A. Sanderson & Peter S. LaMantia, Community
Standards for Defining Attempt: Inconsistencies with the Model Penal Code, 39 AM. BEHAV.
SCI. 405, 405 (1996) (documenting survey results in which respondents “believed that the state
law assigned liabilities that matched their own intuitions about appropriate liability
judgments.”).
123
David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the
Pickpocket’s Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 303 (2002).
124
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses,
10 J. ECON. PERSPS. 43, 46–48 (1996).
125
HARCOURT, supra note 56, at 145–71.
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than people who are less likely to commit crime, giving the higher-risk group
harsher penalties than the lower-risk group could actually encourage more
crime than punishing both groups with equal severity.126 High-risk
prospective offenders are likely to offend regardless because they have a
lower elasticity to punishment.127 Low-risk prospective offenders may make
a more dramatic adjustment to their behavior if they are suddenly faced with
much more lenient penalties, thus increasing their rates of offending
significantly.128 On balance, Harcourt argues, expanding risk-based
sentencing could at least hypothetically lead to a net increase in crime.129
But research on deterrence shows unequivocally that people assign
exponentially greater weight to the likelihood of getting caught than they do
to the severity of potential penalties when deciding whether to commit
crime.130 Therefore, Harcourt’s relative elasticity argument has exponentially
greater force in the context of risk-based policing than it does in the context
of risk-based sentencing.131 And the force of that argument could be dwarfed
by the incapacitation-related benefits of risk-based sentencing, if proponents
are right in claiming those benefits.
E. MAKING THE PUBLIC MORE PUNITIVE

Starr argues that even if risk-based sentencing were used with the
explicit intention of reducing overall incarceration rates (and legislation
effectively limited its use for that purpose), it could ultimately lead to more
incarceration.132 Part of what makes the public so punitive, and in turn led to
the exponential growth of our prison populations, they argue, was that the
privileged were largely spared from imprisonment.133 Because risk-based
sentencing only furthers that dynamic, it follows that the public might
become even more punitive if sentencing regimes continue to use risk
assessment tools more and more.134
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But this concern is probably overstated. First, “the privileged” are
already largely spared the burdens of incarceration.135 For example, as Bruce
Western and Becky Pettit document, while almost 60% of Black male high
school dropouts born between 1965 and 1969 were incarcerated by age 30–
34, only 0.7% of White men with at least some higher education born within
that cohort were incarcerated by the same age.136
Furthermore, crime policy is not solely (or even primarily) driven by
privileged people who are completely disconnected from the realities of
crime and punishment.137 Most American crime policy is determined at the
state and local government level and is, in many ways, much more
democratically determined than other areas of public policy.138 As Michael
Fortner and James Forman Jr. document, the punitive turn in crime policy
was driven in large part by fearful residents of poor, predominantly Black
neighborhoods wracked by crime surges in the 1970s and 80s, not solely or
primarily by wealthy White suburbanites for whom crime was a distant
reality.139
F. DISTORTING THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

Harcourt, along with Jessica Eaglin, argue that one should reject riskbased sentencing because it makes both the public and criminal justice
officials think about the justification of punishment in a “distorted” way.140
This critique is different from the idea that one should reject risk-based
sentencing because it is unjust or inefficient. Specifically, Harcourt argues
that “the prediction of future dangerousness has begun to colonize our
theories of punishment.”141 On his view, the rise of actuarial risk-based
sentencing (and policing) has “fundamentally redirected our basic notion of
how best and most fairly to administer the criminal law,” contributing to a
shift away from rehabilitation and toward incapacitation in sentencing theory
and criminal justice policy.142
135
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The idea that risk-based sentencing has “distorted” public or scholarly
ideas about the justification of punishment implies that there is something
wrong with how scholars or the public think about the justification of
punishment as a result. It would seem misleading to say that the rise of riskbased sentencing regimes “distorted” our views about the justification of
punishment, rather than merely “shaped” those views, if it caused us to form
true beliefs about the matter, after all.143
Eaglin and Harcourt’s position can be summarized as follows:
(a) The development of actuarial risk-assessment tools has nudged
scholars or the public to think about the justification of
punishment primarily in terms of its incapacitation effects,
rather than, for example, any retributive or rehabilitative aims
we might have had before; and
(b) This way of thinking about the justification of punishment is
wrong.
If (a) and (b) are true, then the rise of actuarial tools in the sentencing
context caused scholars or the public to form a false belief about the
justification of punishment, or a “distorted theory.”
Eaglin and Harcourt need not defend any particular theory about the
justification of punishment in order to sustain this objection to risk-based
sentencing. But merely showing that the rise of actuarial risk tools in the
sentencing context nudged scholars or the public toward an incapacitationfocused justification of punishment is not enough to support the argument
either. In order to sustain this objection, Eaglin and Harcourt also need to
eliminate the incapacitation-focused model as a plausible theory of
punishment. For if incapacitation actually is a good justification of
punishment, then it would be strange to think that scholars or the public
believing as much is “distorted.”
According to both Eaglin and Harcourt, the rise of actuarial methods in
the sentencing context changed how people thought about the justification of
punishment largely by providing criteria for sentence severity that were
seemingly more objective and determinate than other frameworks could
deliver.144 As Harcourt puts it, “These actuarial instruments allow for a level
of determinacy that cannot be matched by retribution, deterrence theory, or
the harm principle.”145
143
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That is consonant with Morris’ limiting retributivist theory, and the
underlying approach taken in the MPC’s sentencing provisions.146 According
to the MPC Sentencing Provisions, retributive considerations of desert
should only be used to set broad upper and lower limits to the severity of
permissible punishment; such considerations do not establish a precise
quantum of punishment for any given offense.147 Instead, the sentencing
decisions’ incapacitation effects should determine the precise level of
severity that is warranted within the broadly permissible range.148
Eaglin argues that the shift toward an incapacitation-focused
justification of punishment, precipitated by the rise of actuarial risk tools in
the sentencing context, had bad consequences aside from simply leading to
false beliefs about the justification of punishment—in particular,
contributing to the rise of mass incarceration.149 According to Eaglin, the
incapacitation-focused sentencing theory helped legitimate the expansion of
criminal justice systems across the country, exacerbating public fears of
crime—even crime that is not truly harmful or dangerous.150 If that were true,
it would explain how the incapacitation-focused sentencing theory is a kind
of “distorted” belief in one sense. From a consequentialist perspective, that
is, the incapacitation-focused sentencing theory would be the wrong way to
think about the justification of punishment if it were likely to lead to bad
consequences.151
However, this view is not well supported by the empirical evidence.
Ordinary citizens’ fears of crime indeed drove mass incarceration.152 But that
fear was not the product of a change in how people were thinking about the
justification of punishment.153 It was, rather, the product of a massive crime
wave across the country concentrated in poor, predominantly Black urban
communities where the industrial economy was in decline.154
146
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It is not yet clear, as such, why one should worry about the way that
risk-based sentencing has caused the public to think about the justification of
punishment. The incapacitation model of punishment is widely endorsed and
seemingly compelling on the theoretical merits, but cannot plausibly explain
the explosion of prison populations since the 1970s.
III. DISTRIBUTING DE-CARCERATION TO THE DISADVANTAGED
The arguments canvassed above fail to undermine the prevailing
limiting retributivist rationale for risk-based sentencing.155 But the remainder
of this Article will show that risk-based sentencing is indefensible even (and
perhaps especially) according to the theoretical framework its proponents put
forward as its justification. The most plausible interpretation of limiting
retributivism mandates the opposite of what risk-based sentencing
proponents recommend: offenders who present the highest risk of future
crime should actually get the most lenient sentences.
A. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT DESERT

The key premise that underlies the limiting retributivist framework in
the MPC’s new sentencing provisions is:
Uncertainty about Desert: it is impossible to know the precise level or
severity of punishment an offender deserves in any given case. 156
As the Code puts it, “[H]uman moral intuitions about proportionate
penalties in individual cases are almost always rough and approximate.”157
Consider this premise’s full elaboration in the text, which is a core impetus
for the underlying theory as a whole:
Even when a decisionmaker is acquainted with the circumstances of a particular crime
and has a rich understanding of the offender, it is seldom possible, outside of extreme
cases, for the decisionmaker to say that the deserved penalty is precisely x. In Morris’s

important for entry into the more desirable and higher-paying jobs and because increased
reliance on labor-saving devices has contributed to a surplus of untrained black workers.” and
that “blacks tend to be concentrated in areas where the number and characteristics of jobs have
been most significantly altered by shifts in the location of production activity and from
manufacturing to services. Since an overwhelming majority of inner-city blacks lack the
qualifications for the high-skilled segment of the service sector such as information
processing, finance, and real estate, they tend to be concentrated in the low-skilled segment
which features unstable employment, restricted opportunities, and low wages.”).
155
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phrase, the “moral calipers” possessed by human beings are not sufficiently fine-tuned
to reach exact judgments of condign punishments. Instead, most people’s moral
sensibilities, concerning most crimes, will orient them toward a range of permissible
sanctions that are “not undeserved.” Outside the perimeters of the range, some
punishments will appear clearly excessive on grounds of justice, and some will appear
clearly too lenient—but there will nearly always be a substantial gray area between the
two extremes.158

The quantum of punishment a given offender deserves, on the limiting
retributivist view, is vague.159 There are, on this view, clearly undeserved
levels of sentencing severity for any given offense, along with borderline
cases of possibly deserved severity, but never any clear cases of definitely
deserved sentencing severity.160 Since, as the MPC puts it, “[t]here are no
tools in law or philosophy that can render proportionality doctrine an exact
science,” there is no single sentencing decision that we could ever know to
yield exactly the amount of punishment that an offender deserves.161 For
example, think of a typical barfight, where one man beats up another man in
a drunken dispute but there is no severe or lasting injury. Sentencing this
hypothetical offender to 20 years in prison for assault and battery may seem
clearly undeserved. But a two-day, two-week, or two-month sentence could
seem to be at least possibly deserved. Yet, even if we knew all of the granular
details of the case, it would seem impossible to make a precise judgement
about exactly how severely the offender deserves to be punished. How could
a sentencing judge ever know whether the correct answer is, say, two weeks,
four days, and five hours in the county correctional facility or whether it is in
fact, one week, one day, and one hour?
This view is sharply distinguishable from the “non-cognitivist” idea that
there is no fact of the matter about how severely any given offender deserves

158

Id.
That is, according to the limiting retributivist view, there are borderline cases of
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to be punished.162 There are determinate facts about how much punishment
any given offender deserves for any given offense, on the limiting
retributivist view.163 For example, it might indeed be the case that the
offender in the barfight does deserve exactly two weeks, four days, and five
hours in the county correctional facility. And, according to the limiting
retributivist theory, human beings are capable of knowing the facts about
whether a punishment is clearly undeserved.164 But, on that view, human
beings are incapable of knowing the precise level of severity that actually is
deserved in any given case.165 So, if limiting retributivism is correct, then the
best that sentencing officials can do is to punish offenders within the range
of severity where they are unsure whether the punishment fits the crime.166
Limiting retributivism is also sharply distinguishable from a
“disjunctive” view about deserved punishment.167 On a disjunctive view,
there is an identifiable range of deserved sentencing severity for any given
offense-token,168 and any sentence within that range would be equally
deserved.169 That view recommends ranges of sentencing severity for purely
substantive moral reasons, whereas limiting retributivists adopt sentencing
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ranges as a pragmatic response to Uncertainty about Desert—the fact that
we can never be sure of exactly what the relevant moral reasons entail.170
As this Part demonstrate, rather than providing cover for risk-based
sentencing, Uncertainty about Desert makes risk-based sentencing
impossible to justify.
B. SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Neither the MPC’s sentencing provisions, nor Norval Morris’ writings
(upon which those provisions are largely based) provide any substantive
criteria to determine what the upper and lower bounds of sentencing severity
ought to be for any given offense (either offense-types or offense-tokens).171
The MPC provides purely procedural guidance, offering only a minimal
“conceptual and institutional structure to the moral reasoning process for the
derivation of proportionality limits,” rather than venturing into the complex
substantive questions that such a moral reasoning process would inevitably
raise.172 The Code says that as long as the right institutional actors—first, a
“well-constituted” sentencing commission, then the trial and appellate
courts—make these decisions, the sentencing ranges and decisions they come
out with are, ipso facto, legitimate.173 Morris assumed that existing
guidelines-based sentencing regimes—particularly the heavily studied and
widely admired guidelines system in Minnesota—formulated the correct
ranges of severity for permissible punishment.174 But Morris provided no
substantive normative criteria for explaining why Minnesota’s ranges are
correct.175
Furthermore, the mere procedural legitimacy of a sentencing guidelines
system or of an individual sentencing decision does not ensure substantive
justice. A sentencing commission formed in the requisite procedural manner
could conceivably come up with a guidelines system that would be morally
abhorrent. For example, a guidelines system that mandated death by a
thousand cuts for every crime in the book. Limiting retributivism would not
permit this because it is a substantive theory of the principles that ought to
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guide penal policy, not just a procedural theory of who gets to decide what
those principles are.
If Uncertainty about Desert is true, people cannot know the facts about
whether a given offense-type or offense-token deserves any given quantum
of punishment, except in the clearest cases of undeserved sentencing severity.
So, criminal justice officials should be skeptical that sentencing within
existing guidelines ranges will automatically ensure that the punishments
they impose are “not undeserved.”
Given the supposed bipartisan consensus in favor of reducing prison
populations, it is especially strange to assume that existing guidelines—many
of which were conceived during the peak years of prison growth and
widespread fear across the citizenry prompted by a nationwide upsurge in
crime176—just happened to have got it right about the range of sentencing
severity people who break the law morally deserve.
Criminal justice systems in the United States tend toward the punitive
extreme compared to other developed countries177 including some, like
Finland, whose sentencing regimes are explicitly desert-oriented.178 The
conditions of American prisons are much worse, and Americans lock people
up in these facilities for longer.179 There is now a vast empirical literature on
the tremendous amount of damage that imprisonment in the U.S. does to
people’s physical and mental health, along with the myriad ways it destroys
relationships and derails the life course.180 How can one be confident, given
all of this, that American sentencing guidelines are properly calibrated with
respect to desert, and Finland’s are not? Limiting retributivism does not give
us any reason to think this is the case.
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As such, the key normative and epistemological premise that motivates
limiting retributivism—Uncertainty about Desert—also entails the
following principle:
Skepticism about Sentencing Guidelines: Existing guidelines cannot
ensure that sentencing severity is “not undeserved.”181
C. THE ASYMMETRY OF UNDER- AND OVER-PUNISHMENT

This Section provides a provisional defense of the following principle:
Asymmetry: Judges should strongly favor punishing people less than
they deserve over punishing them more than they deserve.
Asymmetry is widely accepted.182 Morris himself emphasized the
importance of desert-based upper limits on sentencing severity more than the
lower limits.183 Richard Frase—who defends a modified version of Morris’
Limiting Retributivist view—argues that Asymmetry is consistent with
Morris’ parsimony principle, constitutional proportionality standards,
chronic resource limits, prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea
bargaining, and the guidelines in Minnesota and other states that have
implemented a Limiting Retributivist model for their sentencing regimes.184
Frase tells us, moreover, that “the upper limits of desert raise
fundamentally different moral questions than lower limits.”185 In Frase’s
view, these upper limits “are about fairness to the defendant and the limits of
governmental power,” while desert-based lower limits “raise different and
less compelling normative issues”—such as fairness to victims or lawabiding people.186 Frase also argues that a Rawlsian view about social justice
entails Asymmetry because contractors in the “original position” would seek
desert-based upper limits on penal severity to ensure that their worst-case
outcome (presumably, being imprisoned) is as good as possible.187
Frase’s moral argument for Asymmetry is controversial, however. It is
difficult to show why fairness to the defendant is a more important interest
than fairness to victims or law-abiding people, why hypothetical Rawlsian
181
The double negative “not underserved” or “not unjust” comes from Morris’
formulation, meant to emphasize the impossibility of making precise judgments of deserved
sentencing severity. See, e.g., Morris & Miller, supra note 14, at 38.
182
See, e.g., FRASE, supra note 9, at 26; HART, supra note 40, at 237; MODEL PENAL
CODE : SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. b (AM . L. INST ., Final Draft 2017); MICHAEL TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 190–92 (1995).
183
See MORRIS, supra note 14, at 74–75.
184
FRASE, supra note 9, at 28.
185
Id. at 26.
186
Id.
187
FRASE, supra note 9, at 87.
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contractors would be more worried about being incarcerated than being
victimized, or why American criminal legal systems should make decisions
based on a Rawlsian theory of justice. Thus, this Section provides a more
ecumenical (albeit provisional) normative basis for adopting that principle.
The argument for Asymmetry proceeds in two waves. First, this
Section outlines a prima facie substantive case for the principle based on
independent normative considerations. Second, this Section makes an
analogical argument that shows that Asymmetry is entailed by one of the
most deeply entrenched principles in the doctrine of criminal procedure—the
Blackstone principle.
1. Substantive Plausibility Proof
Consider the following case:
Joke Shop: Fred and George are identical twin brothers who own a joke
shop in London. Business takes a turn for the worse when the twins are forced
to close the joke shop for several months during a viral epidemic. With
mounting debt, Fred and George decide to rob Jonko’s, a rival joke shop, in
order to keep their business alive—stealing the owner’s life savings. They
are eventually arrested.
Assume that Fred and George deserve two years in prison for this
offense. Sentencing judges would have no reliable way to discern this precise
point, but the recommended sentencing range for their offense is between one
and three years.
For arbitrary reasons, Fred and George are tried in front of different
judges. Judge Bones has a full English breakfast the morning of Fred’s
sentencing hearing which leaves her feeling satisfied and generous. She gives
Fred the minimum one-year sentence in Azkaban Prison. Judge Umbridge,
by contrast, eats some of her children’s Trix cereal for breakfast (forgetting
that “Trix are for kids”) which leaves her hungry and agitated by the time
George’s sentencing hearing begins. She gives George the maximum threeyear sentence in Azkaban.
Fred gets a year less than he deserves, while George gets a year more
than he deserves. Both twins’ sentences deviate from what they deserve by
exactly one year. Therefore, one might infer that the decisions are equally
bad from a moral perspective. (Let us stipulate that, as identical twins, Fred
and George will both be treated and experience prison the same way.)188
188
Findings in hedonic psychology suggest that people tend to adapt to life in prison. See,
e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1046–49 (2009). This might suggest some further difference between

248

LEWIS

[Vol. 112

This conclusion might be plausible if desert were the only value relevant
to comparing the moral magnitude of these two kinds of errors. But even
retributivists, for whom desert is the central justifying aim of punishment,
acknowledge that this is not the only value we ought to care about.189 As
Göran Duus-Otterström argues, the guilty’s deserved suffering might be a
good thing in one respect, if retributivism is to be believed, but suffering is
still generally bad.190 Punishment is a way of making people suffer. Thus,
Duus-Otterström infers, an overly lenient sentence results in less suffering
overall than an overly severe sentence for the same crime.191
For example, in the case above, both Fred and George’s sentences
represent a one year deviation from what each of the two deserve. But Fred
only has to suffer in prison for one year, while George has to suffer for three
years. So, George’s sentence is worse than Fred’s, from a moral perspective,
because it deviates from desert by the same amount, but causes more
suffering overall.
Duus-Otterström’s argument is invalid, however. He fails to consider
that punishment affects offenders’ families and communities, potential future
victims, and the society at large—not just the alleged offender.192 It is
impossible to compare the effects of over and under punishment on aggregate
social welfare a priori. One needs to consider empirical research to weigh
the effects of different sentencing policies and decisions.
However, something close to what Duus-Otterström suggests is
plausible in the American context considering current empirical research.
Punishment has bad consequences for offenders, their families, their
communities, and for society as a whole.193 Punishment also helps to prevent
certain kinds of suffering or harm—particularly the suffering associated with

the extent to which Fred is under-punished compared to the extent to which George is overpunished. Much of that adaptation occurs over the first few months of incarceration, however.
Id. at 1048. So, for the sake of simplicity, let us further stipulate that George’s third year in
Azkaban will not be any worse than Fred’s second year in Azkaban would have been if Judge
Bones had given Fred the sentence he “deserved.”
189
See, e.g., Husak, supra note 9, at 41–47.
190
Göran Duus-Otterström, Why Retributivists Should Endorse Leniency in Punishment,
32 LAW & PHIL. 459, 473–75 (2013).
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
See, e.g., TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION
MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 49–69 (2007) (arguing that concentrated
incarceration in disadvantaged neighborhoods exacerbates financial instability, breaks up
families, weakens social and civic ties, disempowers the political infrastructure, and erodes
informal mechanisms of social control, thus reducing public safety).
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crime victimization.194 But there are diminishing marginal benefits to
incarcerating any given offender over time.195
General deterrence is almost entirely driven by the perceived certainty
of punishment, while severity plays a much smaller role.196 The prospect of
facing a long prison sentence if one is caught, that is, does not deter
prospective criminals from breaking the law.197 Prospective criminals are
deterred by the perception that they are likely to be caught and punished,
which is determined in large part by policing, not sentencing policy.198 Due
to the backlash of concentrated incarceration, replacement effects, and crime
within our jails and prisons, the extent to which prisons genuinely
“incapacitate” people from crime is unclear at best.199 But research on
“criminal careers” conclusively shows that people tend to progressively “age
out” of crime.200 So, there will likely be a sharply diminishing marginal
benefit to incarcerating any given offender. The bad consequences of
punishment are thus more likely to outstrip the good ones (and to do so by a
wider margin) when we punish people more severely than they “deserve,”
compared to when we punish people less severely than they “deserve.”
To fully demonstrate the above argument’s soundness, one would need
to comprehensively weigh the consequences of over and under punishment.
And in order to know when over-punishing and under-punishing occurs from
the perspective of desert, one would first have to establish criteria for
determining exactly what degree of penal severity any given offender
deserves. The first of these tasks would be a massive scholarly undertaking;
the second might simply be impossible. Thus, the first-wave argument
outlined here cannot be regarded as conclusive. But it should at least show
that there are some prima facie reasons to think that the Asymmetry principle
is plausible on substantive moral grounds.
194

I do not take a stance on how much crime is prevented by incarceration at any given
level here. Most of the estimates in the scholarly literature put the elasticity of crime with
respect to incarceration somewhere between .15 and .30. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against
Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1998).
195
See, e.g., David Roodman, OPEN PHILANTHROPY PROJECT , THE IMPACTS OF
INCARCERATION ON CRIME 127–35 (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2007.10268.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7XRK-UXAU].
196
Id. at 27–47; Nagin, supra note 55, at 86–90.
197
Nagin, supra note 55, at 86–90.
198
Id.
199
See, e.g., Ben Gifford, Prison Crime and the Economics of Incarceration, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 71, 71 (2019).
200
See, e.g., Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime,
89 AM. J. SOCIO. 552, 554–62 (1983); Roodman, supra note 195, at 11–12.
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2. Analogical Argument
Let us now turn from the prima facie substantive case for the
Asymmetry principle to the more conclusive analogical argument. This
argument will show that Asymmetry is logically entailed by one of the most
deeply rooted ideas in Anglo-American legal doctrine: The Blackstone
Principle.
Under The Blackstone Principle: punishing the innocent is much
worse than failing to punish the guilty.
William Blackstone famously held that “it is better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”201 Perhaps nobody today
believes that today’s criminal legal systems ought to produce exactly the ratio
that Blackstone suggested—ten “false acquittals” for every one false
conviction. But criminal procedure reflects the underlying principle that
punishing the innocent is much worse than failing to punish the guilty. This
idea is “perhaps the most revered adage in the criminal law, exalted by judges
and scholars alike as ‘a cardinal principle of Anglo-American
jurisprudence.’”202 And it underlies some of the most deeply entrenched
doctrine in criminal procedure.
The Blackstone Principle is most obviously manifested in the standard
of proof required for criminal conviction: “beyond a reasonable doubt.”203
Courts have not typically quantified this standard of proof,204 and some
scholars argue that there is good reason for this.205 But others find value in
doing so,206 and most attempts at quantifying the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard model it as something approaching a 90% credence—in line
with the ratio Blackstone himself suggested.207
The Blackstone Principle is likewise reflected in the rule that every
member of a jury must vote to convict in order for a criminal defendant to be
found guilty.208 And numerous other procedural rules are asymmetrically
201

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.
Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1067–68 (2018) (quoting United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
203
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
204
See United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
205
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1372–75 (1971); Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and
Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1196–97 (1979).
206
See, e.g., C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence,
or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1295–99 (1982).
207
See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?, 26
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 625, 630–31 (2002); McCauliff, supra note 206, at 1325, 1332.
208
That rule is effective in both the federal and state courts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a); Ramos
v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020).
202
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structured to favor false acquittals over false convictions—such as the
defendant’s right to appeal a criminal conviction and the state’s lack of any
corresponding right to appeal an acquittal under any circumstances.209
The Blackstone Principle, along with the standard of proof and other
procedural rules it purportedly justifies, are meant to guide decision making
at the conviction stage of criminal procedure.210 But, as this Section argues,
if The Blackstone Principle is a justified basis for decision-making at the
conviction phase, then a similar principle ought to govern decision making
at the sentencing phase.211 Patrick Tomlin illustrates this continuity through
a defense of the following thesis:
“Equivalence Thesis 2 (ET2): Punishing [a guilty person] more than
they should be punished is ultimately the same kind of error as punishing
someone for something that they did not, in fact, do. Neither error is
inherently worse than the other.”212
The idea that over punishing a guilty person is just as bad as over
punishing an innocent person might seem counterintuitive at first, but there
are a number of powerful reasons that support the idea. And if this idea is
true, then The Blackstone Principle entails Asymmetry.213 The remainder
of this Section shows that this is indeed the case.
First, good procedures do not always or necessarily produce good
decisions, and legitimate authorities do not always do what is morally
right.214 It follows that legislatures, sentencing commissions, and sentencing
judges can all make normative errors about how severely various crime-types
and crime-tokens ought to be punished. Recall that limiting retributivism is
motivated by the thought that these kinds of errors are inevitable given the
limits of human cognition.215
209

Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam).
See Epps, supra note 202, at 1068.
211
This argument draws heavily from Patrick Tomlin, Could the Presumption of
Innocence Protect the Guilty?, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 431, 436–37 (2014).
212
Id. at 436. Tomlin also argues that something like the Blackstone Principle (he calls it
the “Presumption of Innocence Principle,” which is a combination of a presumption of
innocence and a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof) should apply to legislative
decisions about criminalization. See Patrick Tomlin, Extending the Golden Thread?
Criminalisation and the Presumption of Innocence, 21 J. POL. PHIL. 44, 52 (2013). His first
Equivalence Thesis is that “it can be as bad or worse to punish someone for something that
they should not, in fact, be punished for (and did do), as it is to punish someone for something
that they did not, in fact, do (but that is, in principle, punishment-worthy).” Id.
213
The argument here is a reconstruction of Tomlin’s case for ET2, geared toward
intuitiveness and brevity rather than faithfulness to Tomlin’s reasoning. Cf. Tomlin, supra
note 211, at 436–37.
214
See supra Part III.B.
215
See supra Part III.A.
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These kinds of normative errors are, in this context, not importantly
different from empirical errors about whether a given defendant committed
a certain crime, and, for example, what his or her mental state or motivation
was at the time. Both sorts of errors can lead to the same unjust result: people
being punished more than they ought to be.216
Wrongful conviction and excessively harsh sentencing are both subsets
of the more general phenomenon of over punishment. They are both wrong
for the same reason, namely, that in both cases someone is punished more
than they ought to be. As Tomlin puts it, “In the case of wrongful
conviction . . . someone who should receive no punishment receives some
punishment, whilst in the case of punishing someone too much, someone
who should receive some punishment receives too much.”217
There is no reason to think that wrongful conviction is necessarily worse
than excessively harsh sentencing. A wrongful conviction for a petty offense
could be accompanied by an extremely lenient sentence which would amount
to a relatively minor injustice, compared to an excessively harsh sentencing
for an offense that the defendant in fact committed. Tomlin provides an apt
example of this possibility:
Consider Adam, who is wrongly convicted of littering and fined £200.
Now consider Charlie, who is correctly convicted of littering but is sent to
prison for five years. The injustice that Charlie suffers is ultimately of the
same type that Adam suffers—punishment she should not receive—yet the
injustice she suffers is greater: the punishment is so grossly disproportionate
that she is wronged far more than Adam is—he only has to pay a small fine
and receive mild censure when he should receive none.218
If this argument is sound, then Asymmetry follows from The
Blackstone Principle.219
Asymmetry, on its face, seems consistent with—or perhaps even a
good normative justification for—risk-based sentencing.220
216

See Tomlin, supra note 211, at 437.
Id.
218
Id.
219
Of course, The Blackstone Principle might not be justified; some consequentialist legal
scholars and philosophers argue that its costs outweigh its benefits. See, e.g., Epps, supra note
202, at 1121–24. I cannot venture into those debates here. But given the combination of prima
facie moral reasons to believe it, and the logical connection it has with one of our most deeply
entrenched principles, Asymmetry should seem at least plausible.
220
As Frase puts it, “Some may argue that risk-based sentence adjustments are
unacceptable even if they are used entirely for mitigation. But reduced punishment for lowrisk offenders is consistent with [his “expanded” Limiting Retributivist model’s] asymmetric
approach and the parsimony principle. Treating all such offenders . . . as if they were as risky
217
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But, as this Article demonstrates below, the principles drawn out here
actually undermine the case for risk-based sentencing, and in fact suggest
that criminal justice officials should focus sentencing cutbacks on those who
pose the greatest risk of reoffending.
D. DISADVANTAGE AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

A number of criminal law theorists, including myself, defend one
version or another of the following principle:221
Disadvantage as a Mitigating Factor: social and economic
disadvantage should mitigate one’s liability to legal punishment for most
crime.
The demographic characteristics that predict future crime are correlated
with, and often constitutive of, social and economic disadvantage.222 So if
disadvantage indeed ought to mitigate one’s liability to legal punishment,
then risk-based sentencing systematically saves the heaviest sanctions for
those who are least liable to punishment and gives the lightest sentences to
those who are most liable to punishment. As such, risk-based sentencing does
not determine the severity of punishment in a merely arbitrary way, based on
factors that are irrelevant to how much we are justified in blaming them.
Rather, it would appear to systematically render decisions that are morally
backward in an important respect.
Of course, the idea that social and economic disadvantage ought to
mitigate one’s liability to legal punishment for most crime is controversial.223
Many legal theorists think that it is impossible to determine whether socioeconomic disadvantage should mitigate criminal responsibility without first
reaching answers on bigger, seemingly intractable questions in philosophy
and the social sciences: e.g., the nature of social justice and the extent to

as the average offender would waste scarce resources and impose needless hardship. Nor, if
one accepts the premises of limiting retributivism . . . is the denial of mitigation to higher-risk
offenders equivalent to unfairly ‘punishing’ them for statuses they may have little or no power
to control.” FRASE, supra note 9, at 36.
221
See Lewis, supra note 17 at 13–18. For a useful overview of some of the previous
literature, see Benjamin Ewing, Recent Work on Punishment and Criminogenic Disadvantage,
37 LAW & PHIL. 29 (2018). Four of the most influential discussions of poverty or disadvantage
as a potential mitigating factor can be found in United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 960–
61 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the
Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976); Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”:
Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW
& INEQ. 9 (1985); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 217
(1973).
222
See sources cited supra note 58.
223
See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 221, at 36–55.
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which it is realized in any given context, the relationship between free will
and moral responsibility, and the social and psychosomatic determinants of
crime.224
But in other recent work, I provide a defense of Disadvantage as a
Mitigating Factor that avoids taking a position on these ostensibly
intractable questions.225 Call the view the “Incentive Theory” of criminal
responsibility. The “Incentive Theory” avoids some of the main problems
associated with other neighboring theories, relies on fewer controversial
normative and empirical premises, applies to a wider range of crime-types,
and provides a more ecumenical foundation for judicial sentencing
decisions.226
According to the “Incentive Theory,” the severity of justified
punishment for any given offense depends in part on the amount of ill will
that offense manifests.227 The amount of ill will that any given crime
manifests depends in large part on the strength of the offender’s objective
incentives to commit that crime.228 In the “Incentive Theory,” the strength of
one’s incentives to commit any given crime depend on the extent to which
committing the offense in question would foreseeably add to the offender’s
bundle of what Rawls called the “primary goods”229—things that anybody
would want, regardless of whatever else they wanted—or in terms of Sen’s
“Capabilities Approach” which tracks one’s opportunities to live a life they
have reason to value.230
Socially and economically disadvantaged people stand to gain much
more than the wealthy, powerful, and entitled classes, in terms of either of
these metrics, from committing most criminal offenses. This is most obvious
in cases where the crime is economically motivated, has a clear financial
payoff, and is committed intentionally with full awareness of the
224

See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge
Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1258–60 (1976); Victor Tadros, Poverty and Criminal
Responsibility, 43 J. VALUE INQUIRY 391, 391 (2009); R. A. Duff, Blame, Moral Standing and
the Legitimacy of the Criminal Trial 23 RATIO 123, 137–39 (2010); Gary Watson, A Moral
Predicament in the Criminal Law, 58 INQUIRY 168, 175 (2015).
225
Lewis, supra note 17, at 3.
226
Id.
227
This does not entail that the underlying justification for sentencing decisions is
necessarily deontological. See, e.g., PAUL ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 175–212 (2008); Charles Fried, Moral
Causation, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1258, 1268 (1964).
228
Lewis, supra note 17, at 13–18.
229
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 58–61 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001).
230
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 225–90 (2009).
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consequences for all parties involved. But it is also true even of violent
crimes committed recklessly or negligently and for no financial gain231—
though probably not with sexual violence.232 For in neighborhoods where
poverty is concentrated and violence is common, mutual respect often
becomes a zero-sum game, leaving residents with incentives to adopt a
threatening demeanor and to behave in ways that are often unfriendly,
uncivil, and disrespectful—sometimes breaking the law in doing so.233
Violent crime and the reputation that often comes with it can sometimes be
the best (or the only) way to secure one’s social standing, especially in
response to other acts or threats of violence.234
Offenders who are the least socially and economically advantaged pose
the greatest statistical risk of future crime.235 But, these offenders also,
unsurprisingly, have the strongest incentives to commit crime. With respect
to the vast majority of serious crime, then, risk-based sentencing regimes
would seem to mandate the most severe punishments for the least
blameworthy, and the lightest sanctions for the most blameworthy—
systematically rendering sentencing decisions that look completely
backwards from a moral perspective.
E. FAIRLY DISTRIBUTING REFORM EFFORTS

The core premise that motivates the Limiting Retributivist theory is
Uncertainty about Desert: it is impossible to know the precise level or
severity of punishment an offender deserves in any given case. As this Article
demonstrates, the implications of this premise are much more radical than
the theory’s proponents commonly recognize. In particular, it entails
Skepticism about Sentencing Guidelines: there is no reason to think that
sentencing within existing guidelines ranges will ensure that offenders get
what they deserve. Thus, sentencing decisions must be made against a
backdrop of more radical uncertainty about cardinal desert than proponents
of risk-based sentencing assume. As stated previously, there are a number of
reasons to accept Asymmetry: judges should strongly favor punishing
people less than they deserve over punishing them more than they deserve.
Asymmetry is supported by independent moral considerations and is the
231

See Lewis, supra note 17, at 165–70.
Id.; Lewis, supra note 21, at 1257–58.
233
This is especially, but not exclusively, true for men (in particular, young men), because
neighborhood violence can threaten their sense of masculinity. Elijah Anderson documents
this phenomenon in detail in CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE
OF THE INNER CITY 91–107 (1999).
234
Id.
235
See sources cited supra note 58.
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logical consequence of some of our most entrenched legal principles and
doctrine.
These three principles present a puzzle for sentencing judges. Judges
cannot abandon fairness and proportionality altogether in light of these
principles without forsaking the limiting retributivist justification for riskbased sentencing entirely. That would reduce the sentencing decision to an
act-consequentialist calculation with no limits. But—if it is impossible to
know the precise quantum of punishment an offender deserves in any given
case, and existing sentencing guidelines are not a reliable guide to the morally
permissible range of sentencing severity—then what principles should judges
use to make sentencing decisions?
One thing judges and sentencing commissions can do, in light of these
unavoidable epistemic limitations, is to try to minimize undeserved overpunishment.
Judges and sentencing commissions need not know exactly how
severely any single offender deserves to be punished in absolute terms to do
this. Instead, judges and sentencing commissions can focus sentence
reductions on those who are least deserving of (or liable to) punishment in a
comparative sense. If, as I have argued in depth elsewhere, social and
economic disadvantage should mitigate one’s liability to legal punishment
for most crime, then that means that judges and sentencing commissions
should focus sentence reductions on the disadvantaged.236 Social and
economic disadvantage correlate strongly with one’s risk of committing
crime in the future.237 Offenders who present the highest individual risk of
recidivism are thus the least likely to deserve the severity with which they
are punished under current sentencing regimes.
Risk-based sentencing, by contrast, promises to extend the greatest
leniency to those who are the least likely to face disproportionately severe
sentences. This cannot be justified, even granting the truth of MPC-style
Limiting Retributivism. As this Article argues, the normative framework that
proponents take to justify risk-based sentencing actually entails the opposite
of what proponents defend. Instead of trying to cut sentences for those who
are least likely to reoffend, officials should focus sentence reductions on the
least well-off—who tend to be the most likely to reoffend.
IV. BUT WOULDN’T THAT CAUSE MORE CRIME?
The obvious objection to the argument outlined in Part III is that, even
if it would be fair to give lighter sentences to the disadvantaged (who tend to
236
237

See Lewis, supra note 17 at 13–18.
See sources cited supra note 58.
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pose the most risk of recidivism) and stiffer sentences to the well-off (who
tend to pose the least risk of recidivism), doing so would not be efficient. One
might think that at any given incarceration rate, crime rates would be higher
under the kind of sentencing regime this Article proposes than under a riskbased regime. This would, of course, be especially troublesome given
crime’s harmful effects on America’s least well-off neighborhoods and
communities.238 But, as this Part will show, this objection is not sufficiently
supported by existing social science research, and is likely much less
powerful than it would seem on its face.
Recall that, according to its proponents, risk-based sentencing is an
efficient way to minimize crime at the lowest possible cost given the
combination of (1) crime averted through the relatively longer incapacitation
of riskier offenders, and (2) the fiscal and social benefits that come from the
relatively shorter incarceration and less stringent monitoring of less risky
offenders.239
This outlook depends on an intuitive—but ultimately defective—way
of measuring the benefits of incarceration in terms of what criminologists
call “incapacitation effects.” Criminologists measure the “incapacitation
effects” by projecting an incarcerated offender’s counterfactual likelihood of
committing crime during the prospective period of incarceration, were he or
she to remain free in the community.240 In the literature, this projection is
represented by the Greek lambda (λ).241 The public safety-related benefits of
incarceration are then estimated by adding up the incapacitation effects of
incarcerating various individual offenders. For example, imagine that 100
people are incarcerated for ten years each, and each of them is predicted to
commit one felony per year if they were not locked up. It would follow, on
the incapacitation model, that incarcerating these people will spare the public
from 1,000 felonies.
Though it is intuitively appealing and simplistically elegant, this way of
measuring the benefits of incarceration leads to two major problems. The first
is a general difficulty for any crime policy regime that relies on
criminological measures of incapacitation effects: namely, that these
measures completely—and unjustifiably—ignore crime that occurs inside
prisons and jails.242 The second is more specific to risk-based sentencing,
given the close connection between one’s risk of future crime, and one’s
238
See, e.g., ABT, supra note 4, at 1–15; ELLIOT CURRIE , A PECULIAR INDIFFERENCE :
THE NEGLECTED TOLL OF VIOLENCE ON BLACK AMERICA 1–77 (2020).
239
See supra Part I.B.
240
See, e.g., Piquero & Blumstein, supra note 54, at 271.
241
Id. at 269.
242
See infra Part IV.A.

258

LEWIS

[Vol. 112

socio-economic status or background. “Replacement effects” can mitigate or
cancel out the crime-control benefits of incapacitating specific individuals.243
And concentrated incarceration can erode informal social control at the
neighborhood level, leading to more crime.244 These phenomena are likely to
be most pervasive in the communities from which the least well-off—and,
thus, the riskiest—among the incarcerated come.245 Calculating a crime
policy’s community-level effects by aggregating the individual
incapacitation effects of incarceration overstates the benefits of incarcerating
the badly-off, and understates the benefits of incarcerating the well-off. As
such, it is not at all clear that risk-based sentencing is any more “efficient”
than it would be to do what this Article suggests: namely, for judges and
sentencing commissions to reduce sentencing severity for the socially and
economically disadvantaged who pose the greatest risk of future reoffending.
A. CRIME INSIDE PRISON

Criminological research on “incapacitation effects”—which supposedly
justify risk-based sentencing—treats crime within prisons as non-existent.246
Crime that occurs in prison is underreported and under-prosecuted.247 And
given the conditions of many American prisons, decisions about who is
incarcerated and for how long may dictate who gets hurt and whose rights
are violated, but not whether people get hurt, or how much.248
In popular culture and discourse, this is both known and accepted.249
Convicted criminals, in the popular view, forfeit their rights not only to, for
example, the freedom of movement and association that incarceration
inevitably takes away, but also to bodily integrity, freedom from harm, and
police protection.250 But even if one accepts the view that people forfeit some
of their rights when they commit an imprisonable offense, it is implausible
243
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that they forfeit all of their human rights, or that their interests can be
completely discounted in cost-benefit analysis or social welfare functions as
soon as they are sent to prison.251
It is common knowledge that offenders found guilty of even relatively
minor crimes might be brutalized, beaten, and raped in prison.252 But
policymakers and analysts fail to include these harms in cost-benefit
analyses.253 And at the same time, judges and sentencing commissions do not
include the things that might happen to people inside of our jails and prisons
in how they consider the severity of punishment.254
Crime within prisons shows that using “incapacitation” as a rationale
for penal policy decisions is a dubious proposition. Information about the
extent of prison crime is less reliable than data on crime rates in the free
population.255 Decisions about who should be imprisoned and for how long
cannot be made with the blind assumption that incarcerated people will be
unable to commit crime or cause harm during their imprisonment. That
assumption is both empirically and normatively implausible.256 Crime of all
kinds occurs within prison walls, and that crime cannot be written off or
discounted in cost-benefit analysis or social welfare functions.257
B. BACKLASH AND REPLACEMENT EFFECTS

Incapacitating a specific offender from committing further crime does
not yield a net social benefit when other people in the community end up
committing the same crime as the incarcerated person would have otherwise
committed herself. Unfortunately, the literature on “replacement effects”
suggests that this may often be the case—especially for crimes that are either
conducted or organized by groups or offenses that are “market driven.”258
Organized crime can continue when one gang member or other criminal
251
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enterprise is incarcerated but the others are not. And incarcerating one person
for a market-driven offense—such as trafficking an addictive drug like
heroin—can open new and lucrative criminal opportunities for someone
else.259 The stronger these replacement effects are, the less any change in the
incarceration rate is likely to impact public safety or wellbeing at the
community level.260
The greater the probability that any given offender has of returning to
crime in the future, the stronger these replacement effects are likely to be.
Black, Latino, and poor defendants in criminal cases are more likely to have
prior convictions than their White and wealthy peers and are more likely to
reoffend.261 They are also more likely to commit the kinds of crimes for
which replacement effects are strongest. Young men and boys living in
poverty are much more likely to join gangs than the better-off.262 Black men
and Latinos are over represented in the incarcerated population generally,
relative to their share of the population overall.263 And Black, Latino, and
poor men are even more disproportionately over represented among those
convicted for the offenses with the strongest replacement effects—gangrelated violent crime and trafficking addictive drugs (especially heroin,
crack, and powder cocaine).264
Concentrated incarceration in poor, predominantly Black urban
neighborhoods can also cause crime by making it harder for those
communities to maintain informal mechanisms of social order and control.265
Close to twenty percent of adult men are imprisoned in some of our country’s
least well-off neighborhoods.266 Almost everyone in those communities has
a male family member who either is or has been incarcerated.267 This exerts
a great deal of strain on those families’ personal and economic resources,
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which in turn keeps them in poverty.268 In these circumstances, parents are
hard-pressed to teach their children social skills to keep them out of trouble
with the law.269
As a result, informal social control—which is more important than
formal social control for public safety—is undermined in these
neighborhoods.270 So, increasing rates of imprisonment in communities
where incarceration is already concentrated can cause more crime than it
prevents.271 Conversely, decreasing incarceration rates in these communities
may reduce rates of crime, or at least not elevate them to the extent that
individual assessments of released offenders’ risk of future crime would
predict.272
Whether these negative, community-level externalities outweigh any
incapacitation-related benefits of socio-demographic risk assessment is a
large and thorny criminological question. But it is one that must be addressed
to gain a more realistic picture of the consequences of sentencing and crime
policy decisions.
C. REFOCUSING ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Risk-based sentencing is designed to be an efficient allocation method
for promoting public safety at the lowest fiscal and social cost. But public
safety cannot be understood in terms of incapacitation effects, as they are
currently measured in criminology given empirical research (and gaps in
research) about crime in prison, replacement effects, and the relationship
between concentrated incarceration and informal social control.
There is no benefit to “incapacitating” a large portion of the community
if others will rise to commit the same crimes that today’s prisoners would
have committed had they not been incarcerated. As argued above, these
replacement effects and negative externalities are likely strongest for
offenders who are the most likely to reoffend. How much crime the public
must live with is what fundamentally matters. It does not matter (or at least
not nearly so much) who commits those crimes. And there are reasons to be
skeptical of the extent to which incarcerated people are genuinely
incapacitated, rather than simply redirected, in their criminal endeavors.
It is impossible to tell whether, or to what extent, risk-based sentencing
serves the goal of public safety simply by aggregating our predictions about
268
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individual offenders’ relative likelihood of committing crime outside of
prison. Thus, there is strong reason to doubt that sentencing regimes based
on calculations of each individual offender’s risk of reoffending can truly
serve as efficient mechanisms for promoting public safety at the lowest fiscal
and social cost.
CONCLUSION
In order to reduce the scope of mass incarceration in the United States,
some people who would otherwise be imprisoned must either be released or
remain free. The central question of criminal justice reform, as such, is: who
should those people be? The intuitive answer is: those who pose the lowest
risk of reoffending. Reformers see risk-based sentencing as a politically
feasible and fiscally conservative way to scale back mass incarceration while
preserving public safety without going outside the limits of what justice and
fairness require. But, as this Article demonstrated in Part III, risk-based
sentencing is unfair even by the lights of its own purported justification.
Furthermore, as shown in Part IV, risk-based sentencing is likely not as
efficient as it might seem, and it might even be counterproductive to public
safety or aggregate social wellbeing. Thus, criminal justice reformers and
officials now have sufficient reason to reject it.
Perhaps the most obvious response to these arguments would be to say
that using risk-based sentencing to reduce prison populations is better than
just leaving mass incarceration the way it is. Indeed, it might be. But that
would unjustifiably limit the set of law and policy options under
consideration.
Optimistically, if the backlash effects of concentrated incarceration are
strong enough, and if fiscal savings from decarceration could be reallocated
toward social programs that help prevent future crime, it is possible that the
United States might be able to reduce the scope of mass incarceration at a
similar (or even reduced) cost to public safety using a risk-blind approach to
sentencing. That would be an improvement compared to risk-based
sentencing with respect to fairness and possibly both public safety and fiscal
saving.
But even that optimistic possibility does not completely address the
issue of political feasibility. The public is easily influenced by “Willie
Horton”-type stories about heinous crimes committed by repeat or high-risk
offenders.273 These kinds of evocative narratives lead to the passage of
Megan’s Law, Three Strikes, and other punitive pieces of legislation that
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helped create mass incarceration in the first place.274 Since risk-based
sentencing regimes focus on each offender’s individual likelihood of
recidivism,275 they are well placed to avoid public disapproval as a result of
these kinds of narratives. Even if crime rates were to go up under a risk-based
sentencing regime, for example, the public would not be able to complain
that the system allowed someone known to be dangerous to commit another
heinous crime. So risk-based sentencing gets points for political feasibility,
even under optimistic assumptions.
Feasibility, though, is not a dispositive reason to support a substantive
policy position. Elected officials can neither always make the most popular
decisions, nor can (or should) they base their decision-making solely with the
aim of getting re-elected or retaining popular support. Furthermore, reform
efforts that aim to reduce the scope of mass incarceration might do well to
focus on insulating crime policy from populist influence, and move decisionmaking in this area to a more technocratic space.276 That kind of structural
shift would mute some of the concern about political feasibility that might
continue to drive reformers and policymakers toward risk-based sentencing
despite its moral or economic shortcomings.
Less optimistically, and in my view more realistically, there is unlikely
to be any way for elected officials to simultaneously (1) reduce incarceration
rates while (2) minimizing sacrifices to public safety, (3) saving money, (4)
retaining popular support, and (5) doing what is morally fair. These values
will inevitably clash, and decision-makers have to assign relative weights or
priorities to them in order to know what to do.
I cannot give a full account of how policymakers ought to weigh or
prioritize these potentially clashing values in this article. But it is worth
returning to and reconsidering the meaning of “mass incarceration,” here.
David Garland originally coined the term “mass imprisonment” (though,
“mass incarceration” is now the more common appellation) to refer partly to
the rate at which the U.S. has incarcerated its population over the last four to
five decades compared to other developed democracies around the world and
compared to other periods in our own history. But Garland also intended
“mass imprisonment” to refer to “the social concentration of imprisonment’s
effects” in poor Black communities.277
Reducing the scope of mass incarceration in a meaningful way is a
distributive endeavor, not a mere matter of reducing the overall prison
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population. The more decarceration efforts prioritize the least well-off—and
thus, those who pose the greatest individual risk of reoffending—the more
those efforts contribute toward the goal of genuinely unwinding mass
incarceration.

